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On	Democratic	Despond
As	inequality	in	Nigeria	widens,	Ebenezer	Obadare	explores	the	growing	disenchantment	with	democracy	in	the
most	populous	African	nation.
	
Final	Destinations
A	few	years	ago,	I	noticed	that	an	unusually	high	number	of	well-placed	Nigerians	were	being	reported	in	the	media
as	having	passed	on	in	different	hospitals	and	clinics	outside	the	country.	Once	I	started	keeping	tabs,	two	patterns
clearly	stood	out.	One	was	the	sheer	number	of	people	expiring	from	various	forms	of	cancer—breast,	colon,	lung,
prostate,	ovarian,	etc.	The	second	was	the	choice	of—you	get	the	point—final	destination.	From	a	totally	random	list
I	drew	up	of	twenty-five	people	who	had	died	within	a	ten-year	period	leading	up	to	January	2014,	I	discovered	that
eleven	had	drawn	their	final	breath	in	various	medical	establishments	across	the	United	States,	followed	by	the
United	Kingdom	with	ten.	India,	then	Spain	and	South	Africa	rounded	out	the	list	with	two	and	one	respectively.
In	short	order,	I	published	an	opinion	article	on	the	phenomenon.	In	writing	the	article,	I	had	wished	to	accomplish
three	things.	I	wanted	to	underscore	the	fact	that,	for	various	reasons,	“exit”	had	become	compulsory	both	for	young
Nigerians	seeking	to	make	any	kind	of	headway	in	life	and	members	of	the	older	generation	who	needed	treatment
for	an	assortment	of	ailments.	In	linking	this	imperative	to	travel	to	the	crisis	of	citizenship	in	the	country,	I	endorsed
the	perspective	of	another	Nigerian	commentator,	Yemisi	Ogbe,	who,	in	an	essay	titled	“Birthing	the	American,”
lamented	that,	in	the	collective	psyche	of	the	younger	Nigerian	generation,	“American	was	the	most	desirable	thing	to
be,	British	was	second,	and	Nigerian	completely	unpalatable.”¹
I	felt	a	need	to	explain	why	the	country	had	found	itself	in	this	impasse,	and	why	all	indicators	pointed	to	the	pattern
subsisting	for	as	long	as	the	social	and	political	habits	that	produced	it	were	left	unengaged.	Underfunded	and
mismanaged,	the	Nigerian	health	sector	is	the	epitome	of	the	Nigerian	condition.	As	a	general	rule,	public	hospitals
in	Nigeria	do	not	have	the	capacity	to	diagnose	simple	ailments,	regularly	misdiagnose,	lack	qualified	medical
personnel,	and	are	riddled	by	corruption.	There	is	no	better	illustration	of	the	distrust	with	which	Nigerian	hospitals
are	regarded	than	the	fact	that	while	I	was	writing	this	piece	at	the	beginning	of	the	third	week	of	August	2017,
incumbent	President	Muhammadu	Buhari	had	spent	several	months	in	a	London	hospital,	receiving	treatment	for	an
undisclosed	ailment.	Last	year,	he	budgeted	a	princely	$16	million	for	the	State	House	Medical	Center	for	the	2017
calendar	year,	more	money	than	was	set	aside	for	all	the	country’s	sixteen	federal	teaching	hospitals	combined.
Ultimately,	I	was	motivated	by	a	simple	desire	to	raise	the	temperature	of	public	opinion	in	the	country.	In	calling
attention	to	the	abandonment	of	public	hospitals	by	the	moneyed	elite,	I	intended	to	use	the	steady	deterioration	of
the	health	sector	to	provoke	a	broader	reflection	on	the	widening	chasm	between	the	reality	of	Nigeria’s	democratic
experience	and	the	bright	expectations	that	a	majority	of	Nigerians	had	as	the	military	era	drew	to	a	close	at	the	end
of	the	1990s.
Great	Expectations
In	the	early	1990s,	I	was	a	political	reporter	for	a	Lagos-based	prodemocracy	newsmagazine,	TEMPO.	By	the	late
1980s,	most	Nigerians	had	tired	of	the	military’s	grip	on	power.	When	the	presidential	election	of	June	12,	1993
became	inconclusive	after	military	despot	Ibrahim	Babangida	abruptly	canceled	the	results,	the	country	was	plunged
into	a	lingering	political	morass.	TEMPO	was	the	arrowhead	of	mobilization	by	an	irate	civil	society	to	have	the
cancellation	reversed	and	the	presumed	winner	of	the	election,	millionaire	businessman	MKO	Abiola,	installed	as
president.
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Not	least	because	it	was	dominated	by	an	often	bloody
confrontation	between	a	military	state	and	civil	society,
the	1990s	was	a	tense	period	in	Nigerian	history.
Although	Babangida	eventually	succumbed	to	pressure
and	vacated	power	in	August	1993,	the	stooge	interim
government	that	he	installed	was	listless,	and	it	came	as
no	surprise	when	it	was	taken	down	by	another	military
general,	Sani	Abacha,	in	November	of	the	same	year.
Abacha	ruled	Nigeria	with	an	iciness	that	was	unusual
even	for	a	country	that	was	no	stranger	to	military
brutality.	He	chased	the	majority	of	the	democratic
opposition	into	exile	and	threw	into	detention	those	he
could	not	dispatch	with	his	squadron	of	goons.
Yet,	for	all	the	general	nervousness,	this	was	also	a
period	of	febrile	optimism.	For	one	thing,	the	Miracle	of
June	12	(in	which	an	electorate	historically	split	along
Christian-Muslim	lines	voted	overwhelmingly	for	a
Muslim-Muslim	ticket)	had	transformed	the	collective
mood,	one	that	would	not	be	dampened	despite	the
election’s	subsequent	abrogation.	For	another,
prodemocracy	mobilization	strengthened	the	sinews	of
civil	society,	signaling	new	prospects	for	common
participation	in	democratic	politics.	Furthermore,	an
emergent	elite	centered	on	an	uneasy	coalition	of	civic
and	political	leaders	could	not	resist	the	temptation	to
paint	pretty	frescoes	of	the	country’s	prospects	under	a
democratic	dispensation.	And	because	the	military	was
so	dastardly,	it	was	easy	to	suggest,	as	many	did,	that
the	country	would	be	automatically	better	off	upon	the
arrival	of	democracy.
As	I	recall,	not	even	journalists	were	immune	to	this	all-
consuming	sanguinity.	Thus,	one	concern	shared	by
many	senior	editors	at	the	time	was	how	to	reposition	the
newspapering	landscape	the	day	after	the	military
eventually	retreated	into	their	barracks.	Across
newsrooms,	the	fear	was	openly	expressed	that,	with	the	military	adversary	properly	retired,	and	with	state	and	civil
society	finally	concordant,	kindling	the	public	imagination	(or	was	it	just	getting	people	to	continue	to	buy	their
newspapers?)	[one	imagines	Benedict	Anderson’s	acolytes	wondering	whether	both	are	not	in	fact	the	same]	was
going	to	be	a	titanic	task.	Such	was	the	mood	then.	If	anyone	considered	the	challenges	that	the	post-military
dispensation	might	bring	with	it,	they	mostly	kept	their	opinion	to	themselves.
Broken	Dreams
Contemplating	the	contemporary	Nigerian	milieu,	it	is	difficult	to	avoid	the	conclusion	that	democracy’s	reputation	for
delivering	the	good	life	is	massively	inflated.	That	the	country	is	in	a	different	place,	and	this	partly	on	account	of	it	no
longer	being	under	military	rule,	is	not	in	question.	A	new	sensibility	is	certainly	abroad;	but	so	also	is	a	creeping
feeling,	particularly	among,	but	by	no	means	limited	to,	those	who	fought	at	the	barricades	and	welcomed	the
inauguration	of	the	Fourth	Republic	with	quiet	satisfaction	nearly	two	decades	ago,	that	this	is	not	exactly	the	world
that	they	envisaged.
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Quite	what	the	problem	is	can	be	difficult	to	summarize	succinctly.	For	example,	if	regular	elections	are	anything	to
go	by,	the	country’s	democracy	is	in	fine	fettle.	Since	1999,	Nigeria	has	held	several	elections	at	local,	state,	and
federal	levels.	True,	a	majority	of	the	elections	were	tainted	by	ethnic	and	sectarian	violence,	and	only	a	handful	can
be	adjudged	to	have	been	totally	free	and	fair.	Yet,	with	the	possible	exception	of	the	violence	that	broke	out	across
several	northern	states	following	the	April	2011	presidential	vote,	a	violence	that	claimed	an	estimated	eight	hundred
lives,	post	election	violence	in	Nigeria	has	been	more	or	less	manageable.	And	after	then-incumbent	Goodluck
Jonathan	conceded	defeat	and	transferred	power	to	opposition	candidate	Muhammadu	Buhari	in	2015,	the	country
did	attain	another	important	milestone	on	the	road	to	democratic	consolidation.	Thus,	from	all	appearances,	things
are	going	well.
But	periodic	elections	can	obscure	as	much	as	they	reveal.	They	are	perfectly	liable	to	being	co-opted	into	a	logic	in
which	the	practice	of	democracy	is	used	to	invalidate	its	very	essence.	This	seems	to	be	the	case	in	Nigeria	and
other	African	countries	(Kenya,	Zimbabwe,	and,	increasingly,	South	Africa,	come	to	mind)	where	sundry
antidemocratic	forces	have	shown	greater	tactility	in	adapting	to	the	strictures	of	the	new	multiparty	environment.
In	Nigeria,	the	uneasy	coalition	of	civic	and	political	leaders	mentioned	above	did	not	last.	Forged	in	the	twilight	of
military	rule,	no	sooner	had	day	broken	on	civil	rule	and	the	elite	realignments	that	were	its	inevitable
accompaniment	than	it	crumbled.	In	short	order,	key	civic	leaders	would	defect	to	the	state,	but	by	and	large,	the
state	did	not	return	the	compliment.	Nor	did	it	have	to.	Nigeria	has	always	been	a	federalism	in	name	only.	During
the	military	era,	power	flowed	both	from	the	barrel	of	the	gun	and	the	barrel	of	oil.	In	the	Fourth	Republic,	with	the
gun	finally	holstered,	oil	reigns	unchallenged	as	the	master	key	to	unlocking	the	Nigerian	conundrum.
When	oil	commands	top	dollar	in	the	international	market,	as	it	memorably	did	in	the	1970s	when	the	country	was
awash	with	petro-Naira,	and	as	it	did	most	recently	for	large	swaths	of	the	Obasanjo	(1999–2007)	and	Jonathan
(2010–2015)	eras,	things	can	look	rosy	indeed	in	Nigeria.	At	all	levels	of	government,	and	across	those	countless
circles	of	affect	where	the	logic	of	redistribution	ultimately	asserts	itself,	it	becomes	suddenly	easier	for	elites	to	turn
on	the	spigot	of	patronage;	and	while	it	lasts,	the	country	can,	and	frequently	does,	forget	its	problems.
It	is	when	the	bottom	falls	out	of	the	oil	market,	as	it	unfortunately	has	over	the	past	few	years,	that	things	tend	to
take	a	dark	turn.	When	this	happens,	daily	life	reverberates	with	discontent,	and,	with	common	civilities	in	abeyance,
the	ensuing	money	struggles	open	the	floodgates	of	untold	misery	and	degradation.	As	I	write,	multiple	Nigerian	state
governments	are	owing	their	workers	a	backlog	of	salaries	going	back,	in	some	cases,	as	far	as	two	years.
Is	This	All	There	Is—To	Democracy?
Democracy	has	always	had	as	many	enthusiasts	as	critics,	but	over	the	past	decade	or	so,	it	is	the	critics	who	have
been	most	vociferous.	For	example,	with	his	theorizing	around	the	idea	of	post-democracy,	political	scientist	Colin
Crouch	appears	to	have	drilled	down	to	the	essence	of	a	scholarly	consensus	that	something	is	rotten	at	the	very
core	of	Western	liberal	democracy.	In	the	United	States,	the	uncertain	aftermath	of	the	election	of	Donald	Trump	as
president	has	accentuated	this	feeling	of	democratic	decay,	allowing	perennial	reservations	about	the	sustainability
of	liberal	democracy,	as	articulated	by	scholars	and	commentators	as	apart	in	historical	temporality	and	ideological
temperament	as	Randolph	Bourne,	John	Dewey,	Claude	Ake,	Mahmood	Mamdani,	Noam	Chomsky,	and	Elke	Zuern,
to	rise	to	the	surface.
It	is	tempting,	when	beholding	the	turmoil	in	Western	liberal	democracies,	to	jump	to	the	conclusion	that	democracies
everywhere	are	afflicted	in	the	same	way.	But	this	would	only	be	partially	correct.	True,	most	currently	contend	with	a
populist	upsurge,	even	if	in	different	forms,	and	all	feel	the	fury	of	rampant	capitalism,	though	again,	not	in	the	same
way.	Nevertheless,	I	doubt	whether	the	crisis	of	social	democracy	in	any	Western	European	country	can	be	said	to
be	of	the	same	order	as	the	travails	of	a	country	like	Nigeria,	whose	situation	increasingly	resembles	a	permanent
interregnum.	While	the	vestiges	of	the	old	order	persist,	a	new	one	remains	frustratingly	elusive.	In	view	of	this,	when
one	takes	a	closer	look,	it	would	seem	that	the	issue	in	Nigeria	and	other	African	countries	in	a	similar	limbo	is	not
really	that	democracy	has	failed.	Rather,	there	is	a	nagging	sense	that,	precisely	because	the	cables	of	its	founding
principles	have,	properly	speaking,	yet	to	be	laid,	democracy	cannot	be	said	to	have	been	inaugurated.	This	probably
explains	the	frequent	crises	across	the	continent	around	the	question	of	citizenship.
On	the	streets,	where	it	all	counts,	philosophical	debate	on	the	status	of	Nigerian	democracy	can	seem	like	a	luxury.
What	matters	is	that	almost	twenty	years	on,	ordinary	people	feel	greatly	disenchanted,	and	they	wonder,
appropriately,	whether	this	is	all	there	is.
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This	article	was	first	published	on	the	SSRC’s	The	Immanent	Frame.
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The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
	
¹Yemisi	Ogbe,	“Birthing	the	American,”	The	Chimurenga	Chronic	(December	2013).
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